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The Electronic Communications 
 Privacy Act and Cell Location Data 
IS THE WHOLE MORE THAN  
THE SUM OF ITS PARTS? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Cellular phones permit law enforcement to identify 
their users’ locations and track their movements.1 This is an 
enormously powerful tool in the hands of police and 
prosecutors, who have recently used the technology to solve 
and prosecute high profile crimes.2 In New York City, the police 
arrested a night club bouncer after calls from his cell phone 
placed him near where the body of a murder victim was 
dumped.3 In California, the evidence used to convict Scott 
Peterson of murdering his wife included location data gleaned 
from his cell phone that undermined his alibi.4 Perhaps more 
importantly, other crimes have been prevented from 
happening.5 In one case, a thief stole a woman’s car with her 
child and her cell phone inside.6 The police were able to stop 
  
 1 See James X. Dempsey, Digital Search and Seizure: Updating Privacy 
Protections to Keep Pace With Technology, in SEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY 
LAW: EVOLVING LAWS AND PRACTICES IN A SECURITY-DRIVEN WORLD 505 (PLI Pat., 
Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 8966, 2006). 
This data is collectively referred to as “cell site data” or “cell site information” by 
various cases and commentators. This Note will refer to data taken from the 
transmissions of a cell phone that reveal the phone’s physical location as “cell location 
data.” There are different types of this data, each of which has different features and 
may require its own legal analysis. When referring to these specific types of cell 
location data, this Note will use a term that indicates what type is being discussed. See 
infra Part II. 
 2 Stephen V. Treglia, Trailing Cell Phones, N.Y. L.J., July 18, 2006, at 5. 
 3 Nancie L. Katz, Bouncer Pleads Not Guilty in Death of Graduate Student, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 23, 2006.  
 4 Diana Walsh & Stacy Finz, The Peterson Trial: Defendant Lied Often, 
Recorded Calls Show Supporters Misled About Whereabouts, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 26, 
2004, at B1. 
 5 Treglia, supra note 2.  
 6 Girl, 5, Found Safe as Man Steals Car, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Apr. 22, 
2004, at A18 [hereinafter Girl, 5]; see also Treglia, supra note 2 (citing this incident as 
an example of how “cell phone mapping” has prevented crimes in progress).  
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the car and rescue the child within thirty minutes by tracking 
the woman’s cell phone.7 Yet with each increase in law 
enforcement’s power to conduct surveillance comes an 
increased concern for individual privacy. Numerous 
commentators have expressed concern over the ease with 
which the government has accessed data from individuals’ cell 
phones that reveals their whereabouts and permits real-time 
tracking.8  
There is currently no federal statute that explicitly 
strikes the balance between privacy and the needs of law 
enforcement in the context of cell phone tracking.9 Moreover, 
unless police surveillance discloses that the target was at home 
when his or her cell phone transmissions were monitored, the 
Fourth Amendment appears to provide no protection.10 It seems 
that prior to August of 2005 law enforcement agencies 
requested, and were routinely granted, the authority to access 
cell location data with minimal judicial oversight.11 In that 
month, a federal district court in New York, after soliciting an 
amicus brief from privacy advocates, issued an opinion denying 
the government’s application for access to an individual’s cell 
location data and stated that it would not grant any such 
application without a showing of probable cause.12 Since then, a 
slew of district courts have considered whether the Electronic 
  
 7 Girl, 5, supra note 6. 
 8 See Dempsey, supra note 1, at 529, 537 (noting that until recently the 
government routinely received cell site information on a less than probable cause 
basis); JAY STANLEY, THE SURVEILLANCE-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: HOW THE AMERICAN 
GOVERNMENT IS CONSCRIPTING BUSINESS AND INDIVIDUALS IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF A 
SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 14 (2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/ 
surveillance_report.pdf; Steven B. Toeniskoetter, Preventing a Modern Panopticon: 
Law Enforcement Acquisition of Real-Time Cellular Tracking Data, 13 RICHMOND J.L. 
& TECH. 16, 16 (2007); see also M. Wesley Clark, Cell Phones as Tracking Devices, 41 
VAL. U. L. REV. 1413, 1413 (2006) (noting the advantages of cell phone tracking for law 
enforcement); Stephanie Lockwood, Recent Development, Who Knows Where You’ve 
Been? Privacy Concerns Regarding the Use of Cellular Phones as Personal Locators, 18 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307, 311 (2004). 
 9 See Dempsey, supra note 1, at 533. 
 10 See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text. 
 11 Dempsey, supra note 1, at 537.  
 12 In re Application of the United States for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use 
of a Pen Register and a Trap and Trace Device and (2) Authorizing Release of 
Subscriber Information and/or Cell Site Information (E.D.N.Y. I), 384 F. Supp. 2d 562, 
563-64 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). At the very least, prior to E.D.N.Y. I, there were no published 
opinions denying such applications. Because the names of the published cases are 
extremely unwieldy, this Note will refer to the cases by the jurisdiction in which they 
were decided. Where a single jurisdiction has produced more than one published 
opinion, a Roman numeral will indicate the opinion’s chronological position within that 
jurisdiction’s published opinions. 
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Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (“ECPA”), taken together 
with the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act 
of 1994 (“CALEA”) and the Stored Communications Act 
(“SCA”), permits the government to compel a phone company to 
disclose such information on a lesser showing than probable 
cause, or whether the government must obtain a warrant to 
access cell location data.13 A majority of the cases have held 
that a warrant is required for the contested types of data, 
although they have produced varying analyses of the issue.14 
This Note argues that a warrant issued upon probable 
cause is the appropriate form of authorization for law 
enforcement to conduct certain types of surveillance made 
possible by cell location data.15 To reach that conclusion, this 
Note analyzes the leading opinions to date and concludes that 
the government’s argument is irredeemably flawed. Part II of 
this Note discusses the technology of cellular telephony, with a 
special emphasis on the features of cellular phones that reveal 
their users’ locations. Particular emphasis is placed on 
identifying the different kinds of data that can be gleaned from 
cell phone transmissions. Part III explains the statutory and 
  
 13 See, e.g., In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with 
Cell Site Location Authority (Texas I), 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 765 (S.D. Tex. 2005) 
(denying government request); In re Application of the United States for an Order (1) 
Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and a Trap and Trace Device and (2) Authorizing 
Release of Subscriber Information and/or Cell Site Information (E.D.N.Y. II), 396 F. 
Supp. 2d 294, 295 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (denying government request); In re Application of 
the United States for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen 
Register and trap and Trace Device, and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber and 
Other Information (Texas II), 433 F. Supp. 2d 804 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (granting 
government’s request); In re Application of the United States of America for an Order 
Authorizing (1) Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device or 
Process, (2) Access to Customer Records, and (3) Cell Phone Tracking (Texas III), 441 
F. Supp. 2d 816, 837 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (denying government request); In re Application 
of the United States of America for an Order for Disclosure of Telecommunications 
Records and Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace (S.D.N.Y. I), 
405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 436 (S.D.N.Y 2005) (approving government request). For a 
discussion of probable cause and the warrant requirement, see infra note 51. 
 14 This Note will confine its discussion, to the extent possible, to the opinions 
of Magistrate Judge Smith in the Southern District of Texas (Texas I and Texas III), 
and the single opinion of Magistrate Judge Gorenstein (S.D.N.Y. I). These opinions 
offer the most cogent analyses of the competing theories. For a discussion of these 
cases, see infra Part IV. As of this writing, the other cases that have rejected law 
enforcement’s arguments include: In re Application of the United States of America for 
an Order Authorizing the Disclosure of Prospective Cell Site Information (E.D. Wis.), 
No. 06-Misc-004, 2006 WL 2871743, at *5 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 6, 2006); In re Application for 
an Order Authorizing the Installation and use of a Pen Register and Directing the 
Disclosure of Telecommunications Records for the Cellular Phone Assigned the 
Number [Sealed] (Maryland III), 439 F. Supp. 2d 456, 456-57 (D. Md. 2006). 
 15 For a discussion of tracking devices and the probable cause requirement, 
see infra note 51 and accompanying text. 
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constitutional context of the “cell site cases.” This discussion 
highlights the features of federal legislation that law 
enforcement and privacy advocates have used in making their 
respective arguments. Part IV analyzes the cases that have 
considered law enforcement applications to obtain cell location 
data and offers a critique of the analyses the cases have 
produced. Part V concludes the Note by suggesting statutory 
amendments that would remediate the ambiguities in the 
statutes and address the policy concerns raised by warrantless 
cell phone monitoring. 
II. TECHNOLOGICAL BACKGROUND 
Wireless telephony operates through a network of cell 
towers that emit radio frequencies capable of carrying the 
human voice and other data.16 Cell towers operate much like a 
conventional radio tower, but emit radio frequencies at a 
comparatively low power.17 The same frequencies, therefore, 
can be used by a nearby tower without having the signals from 
one tower interfere with those of another.18 This innovation is 
at the core of cellular technology, permitting many people in a 
relatively small area to communicate using the same radio 
frequencies.19 Because there will be a greater number of users 
in densely packed urban areas than in rural and suburban 
areas, cell towers are much closer together in big cities.20 The 
cells themselves are thought of as hexagonal zones, with a cell 
tower sitting wherever three hexagons meet.21 The spot at 
which the cell tower sits is referred to as the “cell site.”22 Each 
cell might therefore be serviced by six different towers, any one 
or all of which could pick up the signal of a phone located 
  
 16 See Marshall Brain & Jeff Tyson, How Cell Phones Work, available at 
http://www22.verizon.com/about/community/learningcenter/articles/displayarticle1/0,,
1008z1,00.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2007). The present controversy deals with police 
surveillance via conventional wireless telephony and does not involve Global 
Positioning Systems (“GPS”) technology. Although related, the legal questions those 
technologies pose are distinct from the ones present in the cell location cases. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. Radio frequencies are a naturally limited resource. Id. 
 20 See Tom Farley & Mark van der Hoek, Cellular Telephone Basics, Jan. 1, 
2006, http://www.privateline.com/mt_cellbasics/index.html. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id.  
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within the cell.23 The area within a cell that is serviced by a 
particular tower is a “cell sector.”24 
Cell phones are in near-constant communication with 
surrounding cell towers.25 When turned “on” a cell phone 
automatically searches for the strongest signal available.26 
Once the phone selects the best signal, it transmits the user’s 
identifying data (the subscriber’s ten-digit phone number and a 
thirty-two-digit number unique to the phone itself), so that the 
subscriber’s network knows how to route incoming calls, and so 
that the cell tower can “hand off” the user’s phone to another 
tower if that tower can provide better reception.27 This process 
is called “registration” and takes place every seven seconds.28 
Data generated during registration (“registration data”) is one 
of several kinds of cell location data that law enforcement 
might use to locate an individual without listening in on any of 
her communications.29 Cell site data, because it only identifies 
the individual cell tower with which the phone is 
communicating, can reveal only the general location of the 
user.30 Other features of wireless telephony, however, permit 
law enforcement to pinpoint the user with much greater 
accuracy. 
One of these features is the “facing.” The typical cell 
tower has three sets of panels, each of which sends and receives 
signals in a 120-degree arc.31 It is possible to determine which 
set of panels, or “face” is communicating with a subscriber’s  
cell phone, thereby indicating which third of the tower’s 
circumference contains the target phone (“facing data”).32 Law 
enforcement can also ascertain the strength of a cell phone 
signal (“signal strength data”), which increases as the phone 
  
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. Registration establishes the “control channel,” the two frequencies the 
phone and tower use to guide incoming and outgoing calls through the network. It is 
important to note that the control channel does not carry any content of the 
communications sent by the cell user. Even once the phone is registered, the phone 
continues to send its identifying information every seven seconds, in part to make sure 
that the hand off to another cell tower is seamless. See Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 750-
51. 
 29 See Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 751. 
 30 S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 449; see also Farley & van der Hoek, supra 
note 20. 
 31 Farley & van der Hoek, supra note 20. 
 32 Id.  
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gets nearer to the tower and decreases as it goes farther away.33 
A cell phone’s location can be determined still more precisely by 
a process called “triangulation.”34 Triangulation compares 
information from multiple towers, measuring either the angle 
at which the phone’s signal strikes the towers’ faces or the 
difference in time it takes the signal to reach the different 
towers.35 All of this data is produced as the phone registers and 
reregisters, as well as at the beginning and end of each call 
made and received (“initiation/termination data”).36  
There is one final aspect of the technology that is 
crucially important: cell phone companies store all this data.37 
Law enforcement may request that a service provider turn over 
the cell location data it has stored among its subscriber records 
(“historical data”) or that the service provider turn over records 
on an ongoing basis (“prospective data”).38 It is this latter type 
of data that permits real-time tracking of individuals.39  
In sum, cell location data can reveal a user’s position 
with varying degrees of precision depending on the 
concentration of cell towers in a given area and the type of 
information that law enforcement is able to access.40 Law 
enforcement can request data sets defined by the precision with 
which they can locate the subject phone (cell site, facing, signal 
strength, and triangulation data) or based on the process that 
generated the signals (initiation/termination data and 
  
 33 See Brain & Tyson, supra note 16. 
 34 Lockwood, supra note 8, at 308 (cited in Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 751 
n.5). 
 35 Id. at 308-09. It is important to note the differences in precision with which 
each data set is capable of locating a phone. The government has argued, and some 
courts have accepted, that a warrant is not required to locate and/or track suspects if 
the monitoring is done with less precision. See S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 449; see 
also Dempsey, supra note 1, at 537. (Data taken from triangulation techniques will be 
referred to as “triangulation data.”) 
 36 Farley & van der Hoek, supra note 20. As with data produced during 
registration, the signals at the beginning and end of the call do not carry any content of 
the communications. If law enforcement were to access call initiation/termination data, 
but not registration data, then it could only spot check a person’s whereabouts, rather 
than monitor his or her movements for an extended period of time. 
 37 See In re Application of the United States of America for an Order 
Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and a Caller Identification 
System on Telephone Numbers [Sealed] and [Sealed] and the Production of Real Time 
Cell Site Information (Maryland I), 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 599 (D. Md. 2005). 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. (noting that “real-time data” is a subset of prospective data). 
 40 Because there are several different types of data sets at issue in this 
controversy, “cell location data” will be used as a blanket term to refer to any data that 
permits law enforcement to locate or track an individual using cell phone signals. “Cell 
site data” will refer to cell location data from a single cell tower. 
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automatic registration data.)41 A data set that includes 
triangulation and signal strength data permits the tracking of 
an individual with the greatest possible degree of precision, 
while cell site data can indicate only generally where a target 
is or was located. Initiation/termination data can reveal the 
phone user’s location at the time he or she made or received a 
call, while registration data can betray the user’s location at all 
times the phone was turned on. Finally, all of the data sets can 
be made available as historical data (data which exists in 
phone company records prior to the time a court order 
compelling its disclosure is issued) or as prospective data (data 
not in existence when the order is issued, but which is turned 
over to law enforcement on an ongoing basis throughout the 
time period set out in the order).42 The types of data law 
enforcement sought in the various published decisions have 
affected the courts’ decisions to grant or deny law enforcement 
access to it, although as this Note argues, the only distinction 
that matters under the ECPA, properly construed, is the 
distinction between historical and prospective data.43 
III. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The Fourth Amendment does not protect information 
that is voluntarily disclosed to third parties.44 Because cell 
phone users disclose their location to the phone company in 
order for the company to process their calls, there is probably 
no constitutional protection for most cell location data.45 The 
Fourth Amendment only prohibits warrantless surveillance of 
  
 41 See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text. 
 42 See Maryland I, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 599. 
 43 See infra notes 160-171 and accompanying text. 
 44 See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979) (records of phone 
calls held by phone company); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) 
(financial records held by bank); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973) 
(financial and tax records held by accountant); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 
302 (1966) (statements made to confidential informant); see also Orin S. Kerr, A User’s 
Guide To The Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide To Amending It, 72 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1210 (2004).  
 45 One magistrate involved in this controversy adopted a rather narrow view 
of the voluntarism of cell site transmissions, stating that at least with regard to 
automatically generated registration data, the phone user cannot be said to have 
“voluntarily conveyed” cell site data to the phone company. Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 
756-57. Another court differed, noting that “the individual has chosen to carry a device 
and to permit transmission of its information to a third party, the [phone service] 
carrier.” S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 449-50. If the former analysis is correct, there 
may be a cognizable Fourth Amendment claim to protect registration data. 
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suspects in their homes.46 Constraints on government 
acquisition of cell location data (and many other forms of 
electronic surveillance) are therefore primarily statutory—a 
state of affairs that is consistent with the history of electronic 
surveillance law.47  
Given the lack of constitutional protection, one might 
find it surprising that there is currently no statute that 
explicitly regulates governmental access to cell location data.48 
Grappling with the ambiguities in existing electronic 
surveillance laws, courts have asked whether prospective cell 
location data should be treated like the data provided by a 
tracking device installed by the police, or rather, whether the 
data should be treated like subscriber records, such as the 
record of numbers dialed by the target phone.49 If cell location 
data is treated like a tracking device, then governmental access 
to it is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3117, enacted as part the 
ECPA.50 A warrant issued pursuant to probable cause would 
then be required (in most instances) to locate or track an 
individual using his or her cell phone.51 If cell location data is 
better analyzed as a form of “subscriber record,” then law 
  
 46 Compare United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716-17 (1984) (Fourth 
Amendment requires a warrant to monitor a tracking device that is within the target’s 
home), with United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983) (no warrant required if a 
tracking device is monitored while the target in on public roads.).  
 47 See Susan N. Herman, The USA PATRIOT Act and the Submajoritarian 
Fourth Amendment, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 67, 72 (2006) (noting that, although the 
customary view is to see the judiciary turning the “constitutional ratchet” to provide 
greater protection for civil liberties than legislatures would require, Congress found 
itself providing more privacy protection from electronic surveillance than the Fourth 
Amendment required throughout most of the Twentieth Century.)  
 48 See Dempsey, supra note 1, at 533.  
 49 See, e.g., Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 750, 753. What might have been a 
more straightforward debate over the proper statutory interpretation is complicated by 
the fact that cell location data provides the same information as tracking devices while 
taking the form of subscriber records. Cell location data is therefore amenable to both 
analogies.  
 50 Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986). 
 51 The law governing tracking devices is not entirely settled. Although a 
warrant is not constitutionally required to install and monitor a tracking device so long 
as the target remains in the public realm, it is usually impossible for government 
agents to know in advance whether a tracking device will disclose that the target is in 
a space, such as the home, where he or she enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
The Fourth Amendment requires the government to obtain a warrant issued pursuant 
to probable cause in order to engage in such surveillance. Karo, 468 U.S. at 716-17. 
Because of the uncertainty over what the tracking device will reveal, the prudent 
magistrate will insist on a showing of probable cause before authorizing the 
installation of such a device. See Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 751-52; JAMES G. CARR & 
PATRICIA L. BELLIA, 1 THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 4:83, at 4-207 (West 
2007).  
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enforcement needs only to obtain a court order upon a showing 
of “specific and articulable facts” demonstrating relevance to an 
ongoing criminal investigation, per the terms of the SCA.52 This 
is a much lighter burden for law enforcement to meet.53 Law 
enforcement agencies argue for the lighter burden of proof, 
advancing a “hybrid theory” that combines two distinct grants 
of authority found in different statutes to authorize cell 
location/tracking, which neither statute recognizes on its own.54  
A final consideration when analyzing the appropriate 
legal framework is that the provisions of the SCA alone appear 
to be sufficient to grant law enforcement access to historical 
cell location data.55 The present controversy therefore deals 
with a question that is significantly narrower than whether 
law enforcement may access cell location data without a 
warrant. More precisely, the question is whether prospective 
cell location data (from the very general “cell site data” to the 
very precise “real-time triangulation data”) is accessible by law 
enforcement subject to the same strictures that govern the use 
of conventional tracking devices.56 The arguments advanced by 
law enforcement agencies and by privacy advocates have 
addressed this precise question. 
A. Law Enforcement’s “Hybrid Theory” 
The government has claimed statutory authority to 
access cell location data under a theory that combines the 
authority granted by multiple statutes.57 The hybrid theory 
posits that federal district courts have the authority to compel 
the disclosure of prospective cell location data when they issue 
an order for a pen register58 in conjunction with an order for 
stored subscriber records.59 Advocates of this theory argue that 
it fulfills the intent of Congress as expressed in the ECPA and 
  
 52 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006).  
 53 See infra notes 64-69 and accompanying text. 
 54 See Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 758 n.13; see also infra Part IV.A. 
 55 See Maryland I, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 600. 
 56 For a discussion of the law regarding tracking devices, see supra note 51 
and accompanying text. 
 57 The term “hybrid theory” was first used in Texas I, see 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 
758 n.13. 
 58 A pen register is the device that law enforcement agents use to record the 
“dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information” transmitted by the target 
phone. Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 761 n.17 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2006)). 
 59 Id. at 761. 
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harmonizes the text of the relevant statutes to form a coherent 
scheme of surveillance regulation.60  
The first building block of the hybrid theory is the 
Pen/Trap Statute.61 The Pen/Trap Statute is part of Title III of 
the ECPA.62 It governs the installation and use of pen registers 
and trap/trace devices.63 The USA PATRIOT Act added the 
term “signaling information,” expanding the pen register’s 
previous scope to encompass all signaling information 
transmitted as part of an electronic communication.64 The 
Pen/Trap Statute provides that a judge “shall enter an ex parte 
order” compelling the cooperation of an electronic 
communications service provider where a government attorney 
has certified that the information likely to be obtained from the 
pen/trap device is “relevant to an ongoing criminal 
investigation.”65 This limited form of review exists “merely to 
safeguard against purely random use of [pen and trap/trace] 
device[s],”66 while ensuring that the devices are promptly 
available to law enforcement agencies.67 “Certified relevance” is 
the lowest evidentiary burden the ECPA imposes upon law 
enforcement.68 Orders for pen/trap devices are the only ones 
that may be issued on such a minimal showing.69 Pen/trap 
authority is granted with minimal judicial oversight because 
  
 60 S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 448-49. 
 61 See id. at 438.  
 62 Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 752. 
 63 Id. A pen register records the numbers of all outgoing calls made by the 
target phone, as well as the time and duration of those phone calls. A trap/trace device 
records the numbers of all phones that place calls to the target phone. Id.; see also 18 
U.S.C. § 3127(3)-(4) (2006).  
 64 USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 216(c)(2), 115 Stat. 272, 
288-90 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2001)). (“USA PATRIOT Act” is an 
acronym for the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act.) This amendment is important to 
hybrid theory advocates, because “signaling information” can potentially cover 
automatic registration data, whereas dialing, routing and addressing information 
cannot. Because registration data permits law enforcement to track cell phones even 
when there is no call in progress, its accessibility greatly increases the government’s 
power to engage in surveillance. See S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 438-39; see also 
supra notes 25-36 and accompanying text.  
 65 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(1) (2006). 
 66 United States v. Hallmark, 911 F.2d 399, 402 (10th Cir. 1990). 
 67 CARR & BELLIA, supra note 51, § 4:81, at 4-200 to -201; see also In re 
Application of the United States of America for an Order Authorizing Installation and 
Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, 846 F. Supp. 1555, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 
1994). 
 68 Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 753. 
 69 See id. 
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Congress believed that the disclosure of this information is 
minimally invasive.70 
Because the target phone transmits cell location data, 
pen registers, not trap/trace devices identify the phone user’s 
location.71 If the hybrid theory correctly asserts that cell 
location data is “dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling 
information,”72 then the terms of the Pen/Trap Statute alone 
permits law enforcement to access cell location data on a 
showing of certified relevance. There is, however, an exception 
to the Pen/Trap Statute, codified elsewhere in the United 
States Code, which regards cell location data.73 The language of 
this exception clearly prevents cell location data from being 
disclosed to law enforcement under the authority of the 
Pen/Trap Statute and, therefore, on the minimal showing of 
certified relevance: 
[W]ith regard to information acquired solely pursuant to the 
authority for pen registers and trap and trace devices (as defined in 
section 3127 of Title 18), such call-identifying information shall not 
include any information that may disclose the physical location of 
the subscriber (except to the extent that the location may be 
determined from the telephone number) . . . .74 
The hybrid theory relies on the language “solely 
pursuant to” for the assertion that Congress intended the 
Pen/Trap Statute, supplemented by some other, unspecified 
form of authority, to permit cell phone location and tracking.75 
The semantic implication of the term “solely” becomes the 
lynchpin in the government’s argument; if the word were not 
there, it would be clear that Congress forbade the use of pen 
registers to obtain cell location data. Because Congress did 
include the phrase “solely pursuant to,” the government’s 
argument that “signaling information,” per the Pen/Trap 
Statute, is accessible by law enforcement when conjoined with 
some other statutory grant of authority has a plausible textual 
  
 70 See Texas III, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 830 (“Legal process [under the ECPA] is 
calibrated to the degree of intrusion. So ‘the greater the privacy interest at stake, the 
higher the [evidentiary] threshold Congress uses.’” Id. at 829 (quoting Orin S. Kerr, 
Internet Surveillance Law After the USA PATRIOT ACT: The Big Brother That Isn’t, 97 
NW. U. L. REV. 607, 620-21 (2003)). 
 71 See S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 439 n.2.  
 72 See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2006). 
 73 Id. at 440.  
 74 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(B) (2006) (enacted as part of CALEA) (emphasis 
added). 
 75 S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 442. 
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basis.76 The other grants of authority that the ECPA provides 
are included in the provisions governing wiretaps,77 tracking 
devices78 and stored communications and subscriber records 
such as email.79 Proponents of the hybrid theory argue that the 
SCA provides the compliment to pen register authority, as 
required by the “exception clause.”80 From the government’s 
perspective, the SCA is an attractive candidate for this role 
because, after the Pen/Trap Statute, the SCA places the lowest 
evidentiary burden on the law enforcement agency seeking 
such an order.81 It is also a textual fit; the critical section 
providing in pertinent part: 
[A governmental entity may require a provider of electronic 
communication service] to disclose a record or other information 
pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service (not 
including the contents of communications) . . . if the governmental 
entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that . . . the records or other 
information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal 
investigation.82 
This final step in the hybrid theory fits together with the 
Pen/Trap Statute because of the breadth of the terms “records 
or other information.” Cell location data could fairly be 
conceptualized as “other information.”83 Various federal courts 
have accepted this theory, issuing orders for the release of 
stored communications (under the SCA) and for the use of a 
pen register (under the Pen/Trap Statute) to access prospective 
cell location data.84  
In summary, the government’s hybrid theory seeks the 
authority to locate and track individuals on a prospective basis 
(as opposed to simply determining where they have been in the 
past) by accessing the data gleaned from their cellular phone 
transmissions. Although it is conceptually coherent to think of 
this data as analogous to the dialing and addressing records 
  
 76 S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 443.  
 77 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006); see also Kerr, supra note 69, at 620 
(referring to the authority for a wiretap as a “superwarrant”). 
 78 18 U.S.C. § 3117; see also Texas I, F. Supp. 2d at 752.  
 79 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (requiring an intermediate showing of “specific and 
articulable facts”) (enacted as part of the SCA). 
 80 S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 448-49.  
 81 Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 753 
 82 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)-(d) (2006). 
 83 See S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 444-48.  
 84 See infra Part IV. 
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accessible by a pen register, Congress has unambiguously 
forbidden the Pen/Trap Statute, standing alone, to authorize 
cell phone tracking. The SCA (the Stored Communications Act), 
clearly authorizes the disclosure of historical cell location data 
but cannot, by its terms, compel the disclosure of prospective 
data.85 Because prospective cell data, especially data obtained 
in real-time, is much more valuable to law enforcement, the 
government has sought to combine the forward-looking grant of 
authority found in the Pen/Trap Statute with the authority to 
access “subscriber records” granted by the SCA in order to 
overcome the prohibition against using the Pen/Trap Statute as 
the sole authority for locating individuals.86 Accepting the 
hybrid theory means accepting that the Pen/Trap Statute and 
the SCA, taken together, grant the government more power to 
conduct electronic surveillance than either statute grants on its 
own. 
B. Privacy Advocates’ Tracking Device Theory 
Those who oppose law enforcement access to cell 
location data on a showing of specific and articulable facts 
argue very simply that, “[w]hile the cell phone was not 
originally conceived as a tracking device, law enforcement 
converts it to that purpose by monitoring cell [location] data.”87 
Under this theory, the portion of the ECPA dealing with 
tracking devices governs access to prospective cell location 
data.88 The term “tracking device” is defined in that section as 
“an electronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking 
of the movement of a person or object.”89 As noted by one 
magistrate, the statute regulating the use of tracking devices 
applies to a device even if it is not designed to be a tracking 
device and even if it serves some purpose other than the 
locating or tracking of individuals; the statute applies so long 
as a device permits the tracking of the movement of a person or 
object.90 The same judge observed that 18 U.S.C. § 3117 makes 
no mention of the precision with which law enforcement may 
  
 85 Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 759, 759 n.16. 
 86 Id. at 761. 
 87 Id. at 754. 
 88 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (2006). 
 89 Id. 
 90 Texas I, 396 F. Supp. at 753. 
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locate the device in question.91 It is therefore irrelevant, for the 
purposes of § 3117, whether law enforcement applies for real-
time triangulation data or cell site data turned over on an 
ongoing basis.92 It might also be noted that the definition of a 
tracking device covers a device used simply to locate a target, 
as long as the device permits the tracking of the target’s 
movement. Once a court accepts that a cell phone is converted 
to a tracking device when law enforcement accesses the user’s 
cell location data, § 3117 is triggered and law enforcement 
should apply for a warrant to obtain the data.93 
The preceding discussion delineated the relevant 
contours of federal electronic surveillance law and offered a 
summary of the two theories competing to govern cell location 
data. The plain language of the relevant statutes makes cell 
location data amenable to both the hybrid and the tracking 
device theories of the ECPA. A decision about which theory 
produces the rule that strikes the right balance between 
privacy and the needs of law enforcement requires a closer 
examination of the opinions that have analyzed the competing 
theories.  
IV. THE CELL LOCATION CASES 
The difficulty that courts face in the cell location cases 
would be understandable if they were confronted only with the 
vagaries of the ECPA. The cases are more vexing still because 
law enforcement has sought various different types of cell 
location data in different cases, and certain courts have found 
the differences persuasive.94 Courts on both sides of the 
controversy have been embroiled in an effort to produce the 
correct textual analysis of the relevant statutes, combining 
interpretive virtuosity with a growing record of legislative 
history. The following is a closer analysis of the two theories, 
viewed through the opinions adopting and rejecting them. 
  
 91 Texas I, 396 F. Supp. at 753. 
 92 See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.  
 93 See supra note 51. 
 94 See Dempsey, supra note 1, at 537; see also Texas III, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 
827.  
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A. Cases Accepting the Hybrid Theory 
Magistrate Judge Gorenstein in the Southern District of 
New York decided the primary case accepting the hybrid 
theory.95 This is the minority rule, with only four other federal 
magistrates joining the analysis in published opinions.96 Cases 
following this opinion have made little use of the tools of 
statutory interpretation other than a plain reading of the 
statutory texts. They do rely to some extent on the legislative 
history behind the statutes, including the testimony of former 
FBI Director Louis Freeh, appearing before Congress to 
support the passage of CALEA.97 Yet the success of the hybrid 
theory seems to depend primarily on its textual analysis of the 
relevant statutes. This textual analysis needs to demonstrate 
that the transmissions from cellular phones are best thought of 
as being both “dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling 
information” in order for the Pen/Trap Statute to apply and as 
a form of “[subscriber] record or other information” in order for 
the SCA to apply.98 Courts in the hybrid camp also need to 
interpret the “exception clause” as the link that combines the 
authority granted by the two statutes.99 
An order for the installation of a pen/trap device permits 
the capture of all “dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling 
information” transmitted by the target phone for a period of up 
  
 95 S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 439. 
 96 In re Application of the United States for an Order for Prospective Cell Site 
Location Information on a Certain Cellular Telephone (S.D.N.Y. III), 2006 WL 
3016316, No. 06 Crim. Misc. 01 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2006); Texas II, 433 F. Supp. 2d 804 
(S.D. Tex. 2006); In re Application of the United States of America for an Order 
Authorizing the Installation and use of a Pen Register with Caller Identification Device 
and Cell Site Location Authority on a Certain Cellular Telephone (W. Va. Opinion), 415 
F. Supp. 2d 663 (S.D. W. Va. 2006); In re Application of the United States for an Order: 
(1) Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device; 
and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Information and/or Cell Site Information 
(La. Opinion), 411 F. Supp. 2d 678 (W.D. La. 2006). The W.Va. Opinion is exceptional 
for recognizing that the exception clause in 47 U.S.C. § 1002 does not apply to the 
tracking of an individual who is carrying a cell phone but is not the subscriber of the 
phone service. Id. at 665-66. In jurisdictions accepting the hybrid theory, law 
enforcement may therefore track a phone that is not in the possession of the subscriber 
pursuant to the authority in the Pen/Trap Statute and on the minimal showing of 
certified relevance required by that statute. For a full discussion of this point, see infra 
notes 153-159 and accompanying text. 
 97 See, e.g., S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 443; La. Opinion, 411 F. Supp. 2d 
at 681. For a discussion of Director Freeh’s testimony, see infra text accompanying 
notes 177-191. 
 98 See S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 438-40; 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(c), 3127(3) 
(2006).  
 99 Id. at 440-43; see also supra text accompanying notes 71-76. 
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to 60 days from the date the order is issued.100 Courts upholding 
the hybrid theory must first accept that cell location data 
qualifies as such information. The support for this first step, as 
analyzed in S.D.N.Y. I, comes from the fact that cell phones 
transmit a signal to cell towers.101 The term “signaling 
information,” then, covers “information on the location of cell 
towers used by a cellular telephone.”102 The court in S.D.N.Y. I 
used the legislative history of the USA PATRIOT Act, which 
added the term “signaling information” to the definition of a 
pen register, in order to buttress its conclusion that the term 
was meant to cover signals transmitted by cell phones.103 That 
history reveals an intention that the term would have a broad 
sweep, stating that “‘signaling information’ would ‘apply across 
the board to all communications media.’”104  
The court’s other argument for bringing cell location 
data under the aegis of the Pen/Trap Statute stems from a  
pre-USA PATRIOT Act case from the Court of Appeals for  
the District of Columbia, in which the court found that  
signals from a cell phone “which are necessary to achieve 
communications between the caller and the party he or she is 
calling, clearly are ‘signaling information.’”105 The court in 
S.D.N.Y. I presumed that Congress was aware of the 
interpretation that the U.S. Telecom court gave to the term 
“signaling information” and intended to incorporate that 
interpretation into the USA PATRIOT Act.106 
  
 100 18 U.S.C. §§ 3123(c), 3127(3) (2006); see also S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 
438 n.1 (noting that in the past the use of a pen register required the actual 
installation of a physical device, but that, at least in the Southern District of New 
York, the same information is conveyed by the telephone service provider in a digital 
format, and that the same standards govern, regardless of the form the data takes). 
 101 S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 438-39. 
 102 Id. at 439.  
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 107-236(I), 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (2001.)). This 
reading of the legislative history is contrary to the analysis performed by the court in 
Texas I, which “note[d] an absence of legislative history indicating that Congress 
intended cell data to be included in this term when it enacted the USA PATRIOT Act.” 
Id. at 439 (citing Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 761).  
 105 S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 439 (citing U.S. Telecomm. Ass’n v. FCC, 
227 F.3d 450, 464 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). At issue in the U.S. Telecom litigation, inter alia, 
was the FCC’s interpretation of this term—in accepting this definition, the D.C. Court 
upheld the FCC interpretation. U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 227 F.3d at 453. 
 106 S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 439 (citing and quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 
434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978) for the proposition that “[w]here . . . Congress adopts a new 
law incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress normally can be presumed to have 
had knowledge of the interpretation given to the incorporated law, at least insofar as it 
affects the new statute.”). 
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The next step in the hybrid theory analysis is to find the 
authority needed to supplement the Pen/Trap Statute in § 2703 
of the SCA.107 The broad language contained in that section of 
the SCA makes this step a fairly easy one, and there is little 
dispute that historical cell location data could be accessed with 
this authority alone.108  
The final step for law enforcement to take in order to 
gain access to prospective cell data on a showing of “specific 
and articulable facts” is to interpret the exception clause 
codified by CALEA.109 It is critical to the success of the hybrid 
theory that the language “solely pursuant to the authority for 
pen registers” be read to mean “pen registers and some other 
form of authority in the ECPA.”110 This is so because the 
S.D.N.Y. I court, and those that follow it, state not only that 
the hybrid theory is a plausible interpretation of the electronic 
surveillance laws, but also the only one possible.111 It appears 
that the advocacy group appearing as amicus in S.D.N.Y. I had 
argued that the exception clause in § 1002 should be read as “a 
simple direction that no cell site information may be obtained 
pursuant to the Pen Register Statute.”112 The structural 
problem with this argument, according to the court, is that if 
cell location data is not accessible via a pen register, then it 
must not be accessible by law enforcement at all, an obvious 
absurdity.113 The court’s thinking goes as follows: a pen register 
(or its digital counterpart) is the mechanism by which law 
enforcement ascertains the cell site being activated by the 
target phone, and if a pen register cannot be involved in 
ascertaining the cell site, then Congress has forbidden law 
enforcement from using a very powerful tool without explicitly 
saying so.114 Although the S.D.N.Y. I court found the “idea of 
combining some [statutory] mechanism with as yet 
undetermined features of [electronic privacy law] . . . an 
unattractive choice,” it saw no other alternative but to accept 
the hybrid theory.115 
  
 107 See supra text accompanying notes 75-83. 
 108 See supra text accompanying notes 82-83; see also Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d 
at 759 n.16. 
 109 See supra note 72. 
 110 See supra text accompanying notes 82-83. 
 111 S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 443-44. 
 112 Id. at 441-42. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at 441. 
 115 Id. at 443-44. 
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The court in S.D.N.Y. I provided a plausible reading of 
the language in the relevant statutes, yet, as the opinion itself 
indicates, “the plain meaning of the words” of an ambiguous 
statute is not a strong foundation upon which to ground a 
statutory construction.116 Because S.D.N.Y. I and those opinions 
adopting its reasoning made little use of the other tools of 
statutory construction, and completely ignored the policy 
implications of the hybrid theory, its validity remains 
questionable. Furthermore, the cases upholding the hybrid 
theory do very little to explain why privacy advocates’ theory  
is unattractive. At most, the courts accepting the government’s 
theory point to the limited precision with which law 
enforcement can track an individual, using the crudest form  
of cell location data.117 The implication appears to be that, 
because certain types of cell location data do not permit the 
tracking of a target with the same precision as a conventional 
tracking device, the analogy, and the privacy advocates’ 
argument, must fail.118  
Whereas the hybrid theory relies almost entirely on a 
tenuous but plausible interpretation of several statutory 
sections regulating electronic surveillance, the alternative 
theory, which analogizes cell location data to the data derivable 
from a conventional tracking device, provides a cogent textual 
analysis, and, more importantly, situates that analysis in the 
overall structure of electronic surveillance law. 
B. Cases Rejecting the Hybrid Theory 
The line of cases that rejects the hybrid theory and 
analogizes cell location data to the data taken from a 
traditional tracking device has provided a thorough critique of 
the hybrid theory and offered its own interpretation of the 
relevant statutes.119 The courts falling into this camp have 
grounded their decisions in a reading of the statutory texts and 
their legislative history that is contrary to the one provided by 
the hybrid theory, and, more importantly, in a structural 
argument that considers the framework of the ECPA as a 
  
 116 S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 438. 
 117 See id. at 437-38. For a discussion of cell location data, see supra notes 31-
36 and accompanying text.  
 118 For a more complete discussion of this point, see infra text accompanying 
notes 160-171. 
 119 See, e.g., Texas III, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 827-37; E.D.N.Y. II, 396 F. Supp. 2d 
at 305-08. 
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whole.120 In seeking congruence with the basic design of the 
ECPA, these cases produce a more coherent interpretation of 
the ambiguous texts than does the ‘plain meaning’ approach 
taken by hybrid theory advocates. The overall soundness of this 
holistic approach is evidenced by the fact that the cases 
adopting it are by far the majority.121 Yet despite an 
increasingly sophisticated and powerful critique of the hybrid 
theory, the hybrid’s resilience was demonstrated in October of 
2006, when a district judge in the Southern District of New 
York joined the hybrid camp.122 The following is a discussion of 
the majority line of cases, which supplies various critiques of 
the hybrid theory and advances a more coherent alternative.  
In light of the pervasive ambiguity in the statutes  
relied upon by the two competing theories (none of them 
actually mentions locating or tracking cellular phones by their 
transmissions), it should come as no surprise that the majority 
line of cases can also claim support for its analysis in the  
text of the relevant statutes.123 The textual support for the 
‘tracking device theory’ is quite sound: it is indisputable that 
cell phones “permit the tracking of the movement of a person or 
thing.”124 Courts accepting this position have also buttressed 
their holdings by referencing legislative history which is—
admittedly—just as ambiguous as the statutes themselves.125 
Perhaps most importantly, the majority line of cases has 
produced a powerful critique of the hybrid theory. The 
following is a discussion of the hybrid theory’s shortcomings 
  
 120 See Texas III, at 827-37. 
 121 In addition to the E.D.N.Y I and II; Texas I and III; Maryland I and III; 
and E.D. Wis. courts, district court opinions rejecting the hybrid theory have been 
handed down in the Western District of New York, In re Application of the United 
States of America for an Order Authorizing Installation and Use of a Pen Register 
(W.D.N.Y.), 415 F. Supp. 2d 211 (W.D.N.Y 2006); the District of Columbia, In re 
Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Release of Prospective 
Cell Site Information, 407 F. Supp. 2d 134 (D.D.C. 2006); In re Applications of the 
United States of America for Orders Authorizing Disclosure of Cell Cite Information, 
2005 WL 3658531 (D.D.C. Oct. 26, 2005); the Southern District of New York, In re 
Application of the United States for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location 
Information on a Certain Cellular Telephone, 2006 WL 468300, No. 06 CRIM. MISC. 
01 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2006); and in the District of Maryland, In re Application of the 
United States of America for Orders Authorizing the Installation and Use of Pen 
Registers and Caller Identification Devices on Telephone Numbers [Sealed] and 
[Sealed] (Maryland II), 416 F. Supp. 2d 390 (D. Md. 2006). 
 122 S.D.N.Y. III, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 454. 
 123 See, e.g., Texas III, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 832. 
 124 See supra text accompanying notes 87-93; 18 U.S.C. 3117 (2006). 
 125 See Texas III, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 832; E.D.N.Y. I, 384 F. Supp. 2d at  
565-66.  
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identified in the opinions that have rejected it. These 
deficiencies are (1) the lack of any text instructing the 
combining of the essential statutes; (2) the period of years 
separating the enactment of the three critical statutes; (3) the 
hybrids’ reliance on the Pen/Trap Statute as the exclusive 
source of authority for cell location data; (4) the theory’s 
interpretation of the exception clause codified by CALEA; (5) 
the significance attached by the hybrid courts to the measure of 
precision with which a cell phone user can be tracked; (6) the 
lack of persuasive legislative history; (7) inconsistency with the 
basic design of the ECPA.126  
1. The Lack of Internal Cross-Referencing 
Courts rejecting the hybrid theory have questioned the 
validity of the theory’s textual analysis. Several courts opposed 
to the hybrid theory have pointed out that none of the statutes 
that the government claims are meant to be combined even 
mentions another.127 Although Congress’ failure to explicitly 
instruct the necessary combination is not fatal to the hybrid 
theory, it is highly unusual for such a large grant of authority 
to law enforcement to receive no explicit mention from either 
the statutes alleged to grant such authority or from their 
legislative history. As the Supreme Court recently stated while 
rejecting an executive-branch claim to broad authority 
purported to be nestled in ambiguous statutory language, 
“Congress . . . does not, one might say, hide elephants in 
mouseholes.”128 To date, no court putting its imprimatur on the 
hybrid theory has offered an explanation for this anomaly.129 
2. The Question of the Hybrid Theory’s “Birthday” 
One court noted that, in addition to the difficulty in 
determining how the ECPA brought the hybrid authority into 
being, there is the question of when that authority first 
existed.130 The Pen/Trap Statute was enacted as part of the 
  
 126 See Texas III, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 827-37; W.D.N.Y., 415 F. Supp. 2d at 217-
19, 218 nn.4-5. 
 127 See, e.g., Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 761. (There is one cross-reference, but 
it is the negative instruction found in 47 U.S.C. § 1002.) 
 128 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267 (2006) (quoting Whitman v. Am. 
Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)). 
 129 See Texas III, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 835. 
 130 Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 765. 
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ECPA in 1986.131 CALEA, which contains the exception clause 
with its critically important phrase “solely pursuant to,” was 
enacted in 1994. The USA PATRIOT Act, which purportedly 
expanded the scope of the Pen/Trap Statute to cover 
registration data, was not passed until 2001.132 Given this 
timeline, accepting the hybrid theory requires accepting that in 
1994 CALEA permitted the Pen/Trap Statute (in conjunction 
with the SCA) to access cell location data, even though cell 
phones were not in widespread use and even though the 
Pen/Trap Statute did not authorize the police to engage in 
meaningful surveillance of cell location data.133 As with the lack 
of internal cross-referencing, hybrid theory proponents have 
not made an effort to explain this glitch.134 
3. The Pen/Trap Statute as the Exclusive Source for 
Cell Location Authority 
One of the assertions made by the leading case 
accepting the hybrid theory is that the Pen/Trap Statute is the 
only possible source of authority by which law enforcement can 
access cell location data.135 The faulty syllogism that produces 
this conclusion runs as follows: Cell location data is “signaling 
information” within the meaning of the Pen/Trap Statute and 
therefore accessible via a pen register. The Pen/Trap Statute 
states that “no person may install or use a pen register . . . 
without first obtaining a court order under [the authority 
granted by the Pen/Trap Statute].”136 Because only a pen 
register can provide the government with “signaling 
information,” it must be that an order for a pen register is a 
necessary component of any court order providing cell location 
data.137 If this were true, it would greatly undermine the 
tracking theory because it would mean that “[a warrant issued 
pursuant to probable cause] cannot by [itself] provide authority 
  
 131 Pub. L. No. 103-414, Title I, § 103. 
 132 Id. 
 133 See id. (arguing the converse, that is, if cell location data were already 
covered by the Pen/Trap Statute, then the 2001 amendment was unnecessary). But see 
supra note 64 and accompanying text (noting that the government has argued 
explicitly that the USA PATRIOT Act added “signaling information” so as to include 
cell location data). 
 134 See Texas III, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 835. 
 135 S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 441. 
 136 Id. at 441; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3123, 3127(3) (2006). 
 137 S.D.N.Y .I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 441. 
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for the Government’s application because any warrant . . . must 
necessarily authorize the installation of a ‘pen register.’”138 In 
other words, given that only a pen register has the 
technological capability to obtain cell location data, to hold that 
an order for a pen register is insufficient legal authority to 
obtain the same information would mean that the government 
cannot obtain cell location data by any means. Such a result, 
the court rightfully concludes, cannot be squared with the clear 
intention of the relevant statutes.139 
Another court responded to this argument, vigorously 
attacking the syllogism.140 This second court stated that if the 
hybrid theory is correct in this regard, then the “pen/trap 
standard is not only a threshold, but also a ceiling,” an equally 
bizarre result.141 It then demonstrated that the hybrid court’s 
conclusion contravenes some of the basic principles of the 
ECPA. The court stated, “One feature of ECPA is that through 
use of greater legal process officials can gain access to any 
information that they could obtain with lesser process.”142 Even 
more convincingly, the court cites the manual published by the 
Department of Justice’s Computer Crime and Intellectual 
Property Section for the proposition that “a § 2703(d) court 
order can compel everything that a subpoena can compel (plus 
additional information), and a search warrant can compel the 
production of everything that a § 2703(d) order can compel (and 
then some.)”143 If still more authority were required, the court 
critiquing the syllogism discussed a Supreme Court opinion 
written before the enactment of the ECPA, which specifically 
stated that a warrant could obtain the type of information later 
covered by the Pen/Trap Statute.144 
There is another serious problem with trying to argue 
that a pen register is the exclusive method for accessing cell 
location data. First, it is not exactly accurate to state that a pen 
register is the device that captures cell location data. The court 
in S.D.N.Y. I itself noted that, at least in its own district, a 
“pen register” no longer refers to a physical device that agents 
  
 138 S.D.N.Y .I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 441.  
 139 Id. at 441-42. 
 140 Texas III, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 829-32. 
 141 Id. at 829. 
 142 Id. (quoting J. CARR & P. BELLIA, supra note 51, § 4:77, at 4-193 internal 
quotes omitted). 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. at 830 (discussing United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977), 
and noting that it has not been overruled in light of the ECPA).  
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install on a subscriber’s line.145 On the contrary, data from a 
“pen register” now exists in the form of a digital record, which 
the phone company provides to law enforcement after receiving 
a court order.146 The court noted that in the context of digital 
telephony, “[t]he Government has properly assumed that, 
despite this change in technology, it is bound to follow the Pen 
Register Statute to obtain information otherwise covered by the 
statute.”147 The court lost itself in its own fictions when it 
asserted that a pen register is the only “device” by which the 
government can obtain cell location data.148 By defeating the 
argument that only a pen register can access cell location data, 
the hybrid theory’s detractors open the possibility that a 
warrant issued in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3117 is the 
appropriate form of authority. 
4. Reading “Solely Pursuant to” in 47 U.S.C. § 1002 
Closely tied to its reading of the Pen/Trap Statute, the 
court in S.D.N.Y. I read the exception clause in 47 U.S.C. 
§ 1002 to mean that an order for a pen register was a necessary 
component of an order for cell location data.149 The court stated 
that “‘[s]olely’ means ‘without another’ or ‘to the exclusion of all 
else.’ If we are told that an act is not done ‘solely’ pursuant to 
some authority, it can only mean that the act is done pursuant 
to that authority ‘with[] another’ authority.”150 In drawing that 
conclusion, the court mistook one possible meaning for the only 
available meaning.  
The court in Texas III responded by asking us to 
“[c]onsider the statement ‘A barrel of oil cannot be purchased 
solely with a $5 bill.’”151 The logic employed by the New York 
court would lead to the conclusion that no amount of currency 
and no property offered as barter could secure the purchase of 
a barrel of oil unless it included or was accompanied by a $5 
bill. The court in Texas III reached a different conclusion—one 
that is amply supported by the design of the ECPA: although 
“some amount of legal process” is necessary to obtain cell 
  
 145 S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 438 n.1. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. 
 148 See id. at 441. 
 149 Id. at 440-44. 
 150 Id. at 442 (internal citations omitted) (alterations and emphasis in 
original). 
 151 Texas III, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 833. 
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location data, the authority granted by the Pen/Trap Statute is 
not enough.152 The Texas court’s barrel of oil example 
demonstrates that the exception clause can be read to mean 
that greater legal process could ‘purchase’ greater powers of 
surveillance. The court thereby demonstrated that the hybrid 
theory’s essential claim—that the exception clause requires pen 
register authority for law enforcement to access cell location 
data—is not the only possible reading of that section.  
Another odd result produced by reading the exception 
clause as the hybrid theory requires was manifested in a case 
from the Southern District of West Virginia (“West Virginia 
Opinion”).153 That court noted that the exception clause 
prohibits a pen register from disclosing the physical location of 
the subscriber to a telephone service.154 Because the target of 
the police surveillance in the West Virginia Opinion was not 
the subscriber to the phone company’s service, but rather was 
using another person’s phone, the court held that the phone 
user’s cell location data was accessible on the minimal showing 
of certified relevance.155 This is problematic for three reasons. 
The first is obvious. By accepting the hybrid theory’s initial 
premise, that cell location data is accessible via a pen register, 
a court is forced to conclude that there is only minimal 
procedural protection available for cell phone users who are  
not the service subscriber. If this were true, it would mean that 
an individual’s privacy interest in being free from having the 
government track his or her movements is created by 
contracting for cellular telephone service. The second problem 
compounds the first. Under the “certified relevance” standard, 
a district court could not question law enforcement’s assertion 
that the target of the surveillance is not the service 
subscriber.156 The West Virginia Opinion exemplified this exact 
  
 152 Texas III, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 833; see also supra notes 40-41 and 
accompanying text.  
 153 In re Application of the United States of America for an Order Authorizing 
the Installation and use of a Pen Register with Caller Identification Device and Cell 
Site Location Authority on a Certain Cellular Telephone (W. Va. Opinion), 415 F. Supp. 
2d 663 (S.D. W. Va. 2006). 
 154 Id. at 665-66; see also 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (2006). 
 155 W. Va. Opinion, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 665-66. The court did note that it would 
not follow the hybrid theory where a subscriber’s location was sought. In drawing its 
distinction, it accepted the premise that a pen register is the proper source of cell 
location data, but rejected in dicta the hybrid theory’s applicability to service 
subscribers. 
 156 See Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 753 (stating that when considering an 
application where the government is held to the evidentiary burden of certified 
relevance, “the judge need not—and, indeed, cannot—independently assess the factual 
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concern when it stated “[t]he United States certifies that the 
fugitive is using another person’s cellphone.”157 The practical 
effect of such a rule would permit the government to engage in 
warrantless, real-time tracking of individuals anytime a 
government agent represents that a suspect is carrying the cell 
phone of another.  
It is no less invasive of one’s privacy to have one’s 
movements tracked when carrying someone else’s cell phone 
than it is to be tracked with one’s own cell phone; this is a 
necessary result of accepting the hybrid theory and is 
inconsistent with the feature of the ECPA that calibrates the 
amount of required legal process to the degree of intrusion into 
one’s privacy.158 Moreover, if the hybrid interpretation of the 
ECPA is the correct one, then the statute is unconstitutional to 
the extent it permits the government to monitor cell phone 
users’ movements within their homes but without a warrant.159  
5. The Precision of Tracking Made Possible by Cell  
Location Data 
Cell location data can be grouped into various types, 
some permitting more precise tracking than others, and some 
involving a different amount of voluntarism on the part of the 
user.160 For instance, in the first published opinion to reject the 
hybrid theory, the government requested prospective cell 
location data, but only regarding the individual cell site 
activated by the target phone.161 In an application before a 
different court, the government requested prospective data, but 
from multiple cell sites, susceptible to triangulation, as well as 
the signal strength data from each cell site.162 The government 
application before that magistrate requested the most precise 
data set possible from conventional wireless telephony.163 Had 
the request been granted, it would have allowed ongoing, real-
  
predicate for the government officials’ certification”) (quoting CARR & BELLIA, supra 
note 51, § 1:26, at 1-25); see also supra text accompanying notes 65-70. 
 157 W. Va. Opinion, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 664. 
 158 See supra note 70. 
 159 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 160 See supra note 45. 
 161 E.D.N.Y. I, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 563; see also E.D.N.Y. II, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 
295. 
 162 Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 749; see also supra text accompanying notes  
31-38.  
 163 See supra text accompanying notes 41-42. 
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time tracking of the subject phone with a high degree of 
precision.164 
By contrast, in the leading case to accept the hybrid 
theory, the government sought, on a prospective basis, cell site 
data and facing data generated at the beginning and end of 
calls, but not triangulation data, signal strength data, or 
automatically generated registration data.165 The split among 
the courts cannot be explained by the differences in the data 
sets requested by law enforcement in the various cases. 
Pointing to the differences in precision made possible by the 
data is at best a partial explanation for the split, evidenced by 
the split between the Eastern District of New York and 
Magistrate Judge Gorenstein’s opinion in S.D.N.Y. I. The 
opinions handed down in the Eastern District denied a 
government application for less invasive data than the 
application which was granted in S.D.N.Y. I.166  
Moreover, if the cases accepting the hybrid theory are 
best understood as permitting the warrantless locating or 
tracking of cell phones when that surveillance is conducted 
with limited precision, then their deciding rationale is 
unsound; it is certainly not rooted in the text of the ECPA.167 As 
one court that rejected the hybrid theory has noted, the federal 
statute defining tracking devices does not include a precision 
requirement in its definition.168 Yet, every one of the cases that 
has accepted the hybrid theory has limited its holding to cell 
location data that reveals only generally the location of its 
target.169 Those courts’ reluctance to grant law enforcement the 
full measure of surveillance capability that the hybrid theory 
authorizes is understandable, but there is no principled basis 
for limiting the theory’s reach in this way.170 The hybrid courts’ 
unease suggests that, however convincingly the hybrid theory 
might account for the text of the relevant statutes, what it 
proposes is just bad policy.  
  
 164 It is unclear exactly how precisely the government would have been able to 
track the phone; that can never be known unless the concentration and arrangement of 
cell towers activated by the phone is also known. See supra text accompanying notes 
20-38. 
 165 S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 437; see also Dempsey, supra note 1, at 537. 
 166 Compare E.D.N.Y. II, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 295-96, with S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. 
Supp. 2d at 437-38 (denying the same application on rehearing). 
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 168 Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 753.  
 169 See Texas III, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 827. 
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6. The Lack of Persuasive Legislative History 
Both sides of the debate claim to have found support in 
the language of the legislative histories of the various statutes 
involved in the debate.171 Although there is a significant 
amount of skepticism regarding the value of legislative history, 
Justice Scalia being its foremost critic, the history of the 
statutes relevant to the present debate has been the topic of 
constant skirmishing between the two camps in the 
controversy.172 Hybrid theorists offer the legislative history of 
the USA PATRIOT Act to reinforce their argument’s essential 
claim that “signaling information” includes “cell location 
data.”173 The quoted history supports the assertion that the 
Pen/Trap Statute authorizes the use of pen registers to capture 
data from cellular phones in addition to other electronic 
communication media, such as email, but it does not shed 
much light on whether cell location data should be construed as 
“signaling information.” Because this is the only legislative 
history that putatively supports the argument that cell location 
data is “signaling information,” this appeal to the statute’s 
history is hardly convincing. One court that rejected the hybrid 
theory likely had this point in mind when it declared that 
“[n]othing in the admittedly abbreviated legislative history of 
the PATRIOT Act suggests this new definition would extend 
the reach of the Pen/Trap Statute to cell phone tracking.”174 
The hybrid proponents’ most convincing use of 
legislative history regards their interpretation of the exception 
clause, codified as part of CALEA.175 Hybrid proponents point to 
the first round of testimony given before Congress by former 
FBI director Louis Freeh, who was appearing to urge the 
enactment of CALEA.176 He stated, “Even when such 
generalized location information . . . is obtained from 
communications service providers, court orders or subpoenas 
  
 171 See, e.g., S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 439-41, 443; Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 
2d at 752 n.7, 753-54, 758, 761-65. 
 172 See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW (1997).  
 173 See S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 438-39; see also supra text accompanying 
notes 101-104. 
 174 Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 761. 
 175 S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 442-43. 
 176 See id. at 443. 
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are required and are obtained.”177 At first blush, the FBI 
director’s use of the words “court orders or subpoenas” and not 
“warrants issued pursuant to probable cause” seems to bolster 
the hybrid argument. This conclusion is significantly 
undermined if Director Freeh was only referring to historical 
data or to a person’s actual, physical address (readily 
identifiable in the erstwhile era of wireline telephony, the 
predominant mode of telephony at the time Freeh made these 
statements) when he used the term “generalized location 
information.”178 Perhaps more to the point, the leading opinion 
to adopt the hybrid theory only used the Freeh statement to 
support its argument that the exception clause contained in 
CALEA can’t be read to “bar[] law enforcement agencies from 
obtaining cell site information entirely,” a point not seriously 
contended in the opinions rejecting the hybrid theory.179  
Courts rejecting the hybrid theory have also relied on 
the statements Freeh made before Congress. In one portion of 
testimony, he stated that the purpose of CALEA was to 
“maintain technological capabilities commensurate with 
existing statutory authority.”180 Freeh’s concern was that, as 
digital telephony—both wireless and wireline—came to replace 
traditional analogue telephony, the existing statutes 
authorizing the compelled cooperation of phone companies 
would be eroded, and that law enforcement would lose the 
ability to “install” pen registers and wiretaps.181 In an attempt 
to allay the concerns of privacy advocates, Freeh stated that 
CALEA “ensures the maintenance of the status quo,” and  
that “the legislation does not enlarge or reduce the 
government’s authority to lawfully conduct court-ordered 
electronic surveillance.”182 This use of legislative history, while 
it tends to strengthen the argument against the hybrid theory, 
is ultimately inconclusive. Relying on this testimony to 
demonstrate that CALEA was not meant to authorize the use 
  
 177 S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 443 (quoting Police Access to Advanced 
Communications Systems: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Technology and the Law of 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 2d Session (1994) (statement of Louis 
Freeh, Director of the FBI) (emphasis added). 
 178 See id. 
 179 Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 181-184. 
 180 Wiretapping Access: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications 
and Finance of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. (1994).  
 181 Id. 
 182 Id.  
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of pen registers to track cell phones simply begs the question of 
whether such use of pen registers is an expansion of the 
government’s pre-digital powers of surveillance or simply 
maintenance of the status quo. 
The fact that both sides of this debate claim the support 
of the same legislative history is not surprising; nor is the fact 
that neither snippet of Freeh’s testimony definitively answers 
the question of what the critical terms mean. Justice Scalia has 
argued that the law is manifested by the “objective indication 
of the words [of a statute], rather than the intent of the 
legislature.”183 He points out that the attempt to discern 
congressional intent from legislative history is flawed in at 
least three related ways. First, it invites judges to implement 
their own policy preferences under the guise of legislative 
intent.184 Second, to suppose an actual intent shared by a 
majority of Congress behind any given statute (to say nothing 
of such statutory minutiae as is involved in the present 
controversy) is to indulge an enormous fiction.185 Indeed, it is 
difficult to imagine that a majority of the members of Congress 
actually thought about and shared an opinion as to how the 
terms “signaling information” or “solely pursuant to” should 
apply to cell location data. Finally, the sheer volume of 
documentation produced in passing new laws means that 
litigators and judges turning to legislative history will find 
“something for everybody.”186 Rather than asking what 
Congress intended but failed to express, the proper inquiry into 
legislative intent asks what Congress’ intentions were, as 
objectively manifested in the words they actually used.187 The 
reasoning in some of the cell location cases exemplify the 
problems inherent in relying on legislative history, and 
validate Justice Scalia’s critiques of the practice.188  
The theory of textualism advanced by Justice Scalia 
offers an alternative interpretive technique for resolving 
ambiguities such as the ones at the heart of the present 
controversy. It urges that words have a limited range of 
possible meanings and seeks to determine the most reasonable 
  
 183 SCALIA, supra note 172, at 29. 
 184 Id. at 30-31. 
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 186 Id. at 36. 
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interpretation of the words themselves.189 While textualism 
does not resort to legislative history, it does consider the 
context in which ambiguous words are situated to determine 
their meaning.190 Whatever may be said of textualism 
generally, relying on the “‘objectified’ intent—the intent that a 
reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed 
alongside the remainder of the corpus juris,” produces a 
decisive insight in the cell location cases.191 Courts accepting 
the hybrid theory have analyzed the critical statutory sections 
only in isolation from the body of federal electronic surveillance 
law. Those courts’ conclusions, though credible on their own 
terms, are inconsistent with the basic design of the ECPA and 
counter to the policies embodied in that statute.192  
7. The Structural Inconsistencies Created by the  
Hybrid Theory 
Considering the texts of the three statutory provisions 
essential to the hybrid theory within the context of the ECPA’s 
regulatory scheme fatally undermines the government’s 
argument. As noted in one prominent opinion rejecting the 
hybrid theory, the provisions of the ECPA that explicitly 
govern access to forms of prospective data contain sealing 
requirements and time limits.193 The SCA contains none.194 The 
court reasoned that these features of the Pen/Trap Statute and 
the SCA indicate that they were tailored to different purposes 
and meant to operate separately rather than in tandem.195 
Another court noted that accepting the hybrid theory requires 
accepting that the “two statutes together accomplish what 
neither can alone.”196 This is especially odd given that the 
statutory ingredients in the hybrid theory were enacted over a 
  
 189 SCALIA, supra note 172, at 24. 
 190 See id. at 20-21, 23-24. 
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 192 See Texas III, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 829; see also Kerr, supra note 70, at 608-
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 193 See Texas III, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 833-36 (noting that wiretaps, which are 
inherently prospective, can be authorized for a maximum of thirty days at a time, that 
pen/trap authorizations expire after sixty days, and that both wiretap and pen/trap 
orders are automatically sealed while orders under the SCA trigger none of these 
privacy protections).  
 194 Id. at 833. 
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fifteen-year period, and that, with one exception, they do not 
cross-reference one another.197  
Another anomaly that the hybrid theory produces in the 
structural coherence of the ECPA was noted by Magistrate 
Judge Smith in the Southern District of Texas: the warrant 
requirement for a tracking device would be redundant if law 
enforcement can effectively track an individual with a cell 
phone.198 While the court’s opinion may have overstated the 
case by suggesting that law enforcement could simply install 
cell phones on people’s cars instead of actual tracking devices 
(thereby obviating the need for a warrant), the point is well-
taken that given the ubiquity of cell phone usage, a tracking 
device would seldom be necessary if the cell phone could 
perform a tracking function while not requiring a warrant.199 
Finally, it has been observed that the ECPA requires 
greater legal process in order for the government to access data 
that is more invasive of an individual’s privacy.200 As part of 
this basic design, the authority for pen registers is quite easy to 
exercise, representing a judgment on the part of Congress that 
phone users have a limited privacy interest in the record of 
phone calls they have made.201 At the other end of the ECPA’s 
spectrum is the authority for wiretapping, requiring what Orin 
Kerr has called the “‘super’ search warrant.”202 Just below the 
super warrant in the hierarchy of legal process is the warrant 
issued pursuant to probable cause, the normal form of 
authorization for installing a tracking device.203 The fact that a 
warrant is normally required to track an individual’s 
movement suggests that a significant privacy interest is 
invaded when law enforcement engages in this type of 
surveillance.  
One potential response from advocates of the hybrid 
theory maintains that traditional pen registers revealed the 
location of phone users at the time they were on the phone, 
usually in their homes and offices, the very places that the 
Supreme Court has held deserve the greatest privacy 
  
 197 Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 764-66. The one cross-reference is a limiting 
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 198 Texas I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 756. 
 199 See id.  
 200 Kerr, supra note 70, at 620-21. 
 201 See supra text accompanying notes 65-70. 
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protections. That this information was and is accessible 
without a warrant suggests that the ECPA also permits cell 
location data to be accessible without a warrant, even when it 
reveals the phone user is inside his or her home. This 
argument fails to acknowledge that technology which permits 
the real-time tracking of individuals is clearly more powerful 
and more invasive than technology that merely determines a 
person was at home or in their office at the time they made a 
phone call. The differences are important. First, the cell phone 
service subscriber is typically the exclusive user of her cell 
phone, whereas ten or fifteen years ago, an entire household 
shared a single phone line. This development increases the 
certainty—to nearly one hundred percent—that the 
government can locate an individual by locating a particular 
phone. Second, pen registers on a landline could disclose the 
person’s whereabouts only at the time they were making a call, 
as opposed to the constant monitoring that cell location data 
makes available. This is not a quantitative but a qualitative 
difference. The difference is so great that it makes cell location 
data functionally indistinguishable from data derived from a 
tracking device and completely unlike the list of dialed 
numbers derivable from a pen register. Under the ECPA, 
whenever the government seeks a greater intrusion into a 
person’s privacy, greater legal process is required.204 This 
observation suggests that emerging forms of electronic 
surveillance—such as cell phone monitoring—should be 
regulated according to function and not according to strained 
linguistic analyses. 
The previous discussion recounted the various critiques 
of the hybrid theory offered by the majority line of cases. Of all 
the conceptual problems posed by the government’s theory, the 
most serious is the observation that the constituent sections of 
the ECPA be interpreted with regard to their function.205 The 
hybrid theory apparently has no answer to this insight; the 
theory’s best defense is a brittle insistence upon one very 
particular reading of the relevant statutory sections. This 
reading studiously ignores the fact that the government 
monitors the movements of a person or thing when it accesses 
prospective cell location data, regardless of whether that data 
is called “signaling information,” “subscriber records” or “data 
  
 204 Kerr, supra note 70, at 620-21. 
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from a tracking device.” Even the cases accepting the hybrid 
theory have limited its impact in a manner that suggests its 
central premise—that law enforcement can use electronic 
surveillance to monitor a person’s whereabouts with a minimal 
amount of judicial oversight—is inconsistent with the policies 
behind the ECPA.206 
V. CONCLUSION  
The debate over cell location data reflects a general 
truth about the current state of electronic media law—it is 
outdated and falling further behind.207 The proliferation of 
Internet traffic and technological advances in such areas as 
data storage and wireless telephony that have taken place in 
the last ten years have profoundly changed the way human 
communities exchange, store, process, and commodify 
information.208 The startling speed of these changes made it 
inevitable that the laws regulating the flow of information 
would lag behind.209 The Internet, now the most important 
information medium for individuals, corporations and 
government, is regulated—to the extent it is regulated at all—
by laws modeled on telephonic communications media.210 The 
awkward fit between those laws and their new subject has not 
gone unnoticed.211 In the context of electronic privacy, courts 
have been left to apply a regulatory framework designed for the 
previous epoch. The controversy over cell location data takes 
place in one small corner of this broad frontier. Striking the 
right balance between the values to which we as a free people 
are committed and the need to protect ourselves from domestic 
and foreign threats is perhaps the most important task facing 
our lawmakers.  
It is by no means clear where that balance is to be 
found, but in our institutions are policies and practices that 
have served us throughout our history and that continue to 
find application to contemporary problems. Foremost among 
them is the doctrine of the separation of powers. Because each 
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branch of our government is given a limited sphere of 
influence, each serves as a check on the power of the others in 
order to preserve the rights and liberties of the sovereign 
American people.212 Updating the Executive’s tool kit in its 
struggle against both the common criminal and sophisticated 
enemies of the state is an important task, but the judiciary has, 
since the time of the founding, provided the check that protects 
Americans’ privacy from government overreaching.213 Although 
the Supreme Court has not extended the Fourth Amendment’s 
warrant requirement to many forms of electronic 
surveillance,214 Congress has legislated in this area and 
imposed greater privacy protections than are required by the 
Constitution.215 The following are some suggestions for 
amendments to the existing statutes that would explicitly 
create a role for judicial oversight regarding cell location data. 
1. Clarifying the Scope of the Pen/Trap Statute. The 
first step in the hybrid theory posits that cell location data is 
accessible via the device (or process) that creates a record of all 
numbers dialed by the target phone and that the government 
may therefore use the legal authorization for such a record to 
locate and track individuals.216 Because of the breadth of its 
terms, the Pen/Trap Statute’s application to cell location data 
is at least plausible.217 Perhaps Congress used such broad terms 
out of a concern that pen registers would be made obsolete by 
the change from analogue to digital and from wireline to 
wireless telephony. Or perhaps they were concerned that 
unforeseen technological changes would quickly render the new 
amendments obsolete. Such an interpretation of the Pen/Trap 
Statute is at least as plausible as the interpretation of the one 
advanced by the hybrid theory.  
Congress should amend 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) by inserting 
language such as “nor shall such information include any data 
that would reveal the physical location of the phone user 
(except to the extent that the location may be determined from 
a wireline-connected telephone number)” after the language in 
that subsection that prohibits intercepting the content of 
  
 212 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assault on the Constitution: Executive Power and 
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communications.218 This amendment would preclude the use of 
pen registers to track cell phones, leaving a warrant issued 
under the authority of 18 U.S.C. § 3117 as the appropriate form 
of authority for compelling the disclosure of cell location data.219 
Such an amendment would also leave intact the “status quo” to 
which Director Freeh referred in his testimony before 
Congress—law enforcement agencies could still access pen 
register data without learning anything about a cell phone 
user’s location.220  
2. Rewording the “Exception Clause.” Another possible 
amendment would more clearly define Congress’ intention 
behind the phrase “solely pursuant to” in the exception clause 
of 47 U.S.C. § 1002. If Congress wanted to prohibit the 
warrantless tracking of cell phones, this section could be 
amended simply by excising the word “solely.” Such change 
would end any speculation that this part of CALEA is an 
implicit instruction to combine two statutes conveying different 
forms of authority so as to authorize a third, remarkably more 
powerful form of surveillance. As it reads now, the most 
natural reading of the phrase “solely pursuant to” supports the 
hybrid theorists’ textual arguments.221 The term “solely” does 
indeed suggest the meaning “with another,” even if it is not (as 
some courts have held) the only possible meaning.222 In the 
absence of some text specifying what that other authority 
should be, it is reasonable to expect law enforcement to select 
its preferred form of authority and equally reasonable to expect 
courts to be divided by the questions raised by government 
applications for cell location data. At the very least, if Congress 
does intend for § 1002 to act as the bridge between the 
Pen/Trap Statute and the SCA, they should amend the section 
by replacing the term “subscriber” with “user” in order to avoid 
the bizarre result in the West Virginia Opinion.223 
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3. Amending the Stored Communications Act. Congress 
could amend the SCA section that completes the hybrid theory 
in much the same way as the Pen/Trap Statute if it wanted to 
prohibit warrantless cell phone tracking.224 The phrase “or any 
information regarding the physical location of the user of such 
service” could be inserted into the parentheses excepting the 
contents of electronic communications from the aegis of 18 
U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1). Such an amendment would be a good  
idea regardless of whether the other amendments are made.  
As one commentator noted, the SCA deals with stored 
communications, but is susceptible to the argument that a 
communication is “stored” the moment its existence is recorded 
by phone company computers.225 The success of such an 
argument would turn the statute—with its focus on making 
records stored in phone company computers accessible to law 
enforcement—into a prospective grant of authority to note calls 
as they take place, provided they are “stored” for some trivial 
amount of time before being disclosed.226 If the record of cell 
towers activated by cell phone transmissions is cognizable as 
“other information,” then the government could, in theory, 
achieve the same result under the SCA that it sought under 
the hybrid theory.227 An amendment that clearly forbade the 
release of a phone user’s physical location would prevent this 
crafty argument from authorizing cell phone tracking. 
Whether or not Congress would want to prohibit 
warrantless cell phone tracking is unclear. The legislature 
could, of course, explicitly authorize the government to conduct 
warrantless cell phone tracking. As long as the target phone is 
never carried into an area where its user enjoys a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, there would be no constitutional defect 
in the application of such a statute.228 This Note has argued, 
however, that such a change in the country’s electronic 
surveillance regime would be a regression. Congress has 
promulgated a scheme that requires a degree of judicial 
oversight, commensurate with the inherent invasion of privacy, 
by requiring the government to obtain an order authorizing 
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such surveillance.229 This is good policy, respecting as it does 
the tension between liberty and order that must always exist 
where a people choose to live freely in a perilous world.  
The hybrid theory presents a textual analysis of federal 
electronic surveillance laws that is plausible on its own terms, 
but fails to explain why cell location data is better analyzed as 
pen register data than as data from a tracking device. It cannot 
account for the regulatory design of the ECPA, discernible in 
the graduated levels of judicial oversight required for more 
invasive forms of surveillance230 nor for the fact that once the 
government can ascertain an individual’s general location with 
cell site data, there is no principled way to prevent the 
government from using more sophisticated data sets to track 
individuals in real time and with a high degree of precision.231 
The alternative theory, by contrast, can account for the 
language in the relevant statutes, support the policies 
embodied in the ECPA, and retain a meaningful role for the 
judiciary in determining, ex ante, how much surveillance the 
executive branch may lawfully conduct.232  
Law enforcement’s ingenuity is on display in the cell 
location cases, and there is cause for satisfaction in the idea 
that police agencies are adapting their techniques to take 
advantage of emerging technologies. Yet, if we are to preserve 
the right to be free from pervasive governmental intrusion in 
our private lives, we must be careful how much deference we 
accord to law enforcement’s claims of authority.233 Treating cell 
location data as analogous to data from a tracking device 
imposes a neutral and detached decision-maker between the 
police, “engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting 
out crime,” and private citizens.234 A careful reading of the 
relevant statutes demonstrates that this conclusion is not only 
preferable, it is the one required by the will of Congress. 
Timothy Stapleton† 
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